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Abstract: 
This paper provides the first nationally representative estimates of how unemployment insurance 
(UI) generosity in the United States affects the search intensity of unemployed individuals using 
individual level variation in UI generosity.  The paper expands the current literature through 
fully simulating monetary eligibility and entitlement to unemployment insurance at the 
individual level where past studies have been unable to examine monetary eligibility and have 
relied on state variations in the maximum weekly benefit amount which can differ significantly 
from an individual’s actual benefit amount.  To simulate monetary eligibility and entitlement, 
work histories of unemployed respondents were obtained through fully matching American Time 
Use Survey respondents to all of their observations in the Current Population Survey, the 
population from which they are drawn.  The results suggest that higher replacement rates are 
associated with large reductions in time spent searching for a job during normal economic 
conditions. However, the results are more mitigated during the Great Recession and post 
recession period with higher replacement rates being associated with small and statistically 
insignificant effects on time spent searching for a job, although these results appear to be 
partially driven by the years 2009 and 2010 which were at the height of the labor market decline. 
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1. Introduction  
Since the onset of the Great Recession, there has been a renewed debate among policy 
makers about how UI generosity affects unemployed individuals’ reemployment probabilities.  
Much of the debate has focused on whether more generous UI benefits reduce how much effort 
recipients put into job search.  This has led to a growing interest among researchers about how 
UI generosity affects time use with much of the research using the American Time Use Survey 
(see Krueger and Mueller (2010), DeLoach and Kurt (2013), Mukoyama, Patterson, Sahin 
(2013), Guler and Taskin (2013)).  However, one limitation with the American Time Use Survey 
is that no information is asked in the survey regarding unemployment insurance eligibility or 
receipt.  This has led several authors to impute UI eligibility based off of the cause of 
unemployment and use the state maximum weekly benefit amount as a proxy for UI generosity 
while also assuming that individuals are eligible for the maximum number of potential weeks of 
UI benefits in their state.  However the concern with this imputation procedure is that individuals 
might not have sufficient past earnings to qualify for UI and only around 35% of eligible 
individuals qualify for the state maximum weekly benefit amount and hence it might not be an 
appropriate proxy for an individual’s actual benefit amount (see Krueger and Meyer (2002)).  
Furthermore, in several states it is possible to qualify for significantly less than the maximum 
number of potential weeks of benefits.  To address these concerns, I obtain earnings histories of 
ATUS respondents and simulate UI eligibility, benefit amounts, and potential weeks of benefits.   
 To obtain earnings histories, this paper takes advantage of the fact that the American 
Time Use Survey (ATUS) is drawn from the eighth and final wave of the Current Population 
Survey.  The CPS provides valuable information about ATUS respondents’ past earnings during 
their base period, the period where UI eligibility, benefit levels, and potential weeks of benefits 
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are determined.  To obtain ATUS respondents' past earnings, I longitudinally match each 
respondent's CPS observations across all eight waves of the survey.  I then determine the number 
of CPS observations that fall within each respondent's base period.  Respondents can have up to 
four CPS observations in their base period and I exclude respondents with less than four 
observations from the analysis.  I then use respondents' hours worked during each wave of their 
base period and their hourly wage to determine base period earnings.   
Base period earnings are then run through a simulation program.  The simulation 
biannually captures the structure of each state UI system to determine monetary eligibility, 
weekly benefit amounts, and potential weeks of benefits for each respondent for the period 
preceding and following the Great Recession from 2003-2013.  The simulation is the first to fully 
simulate eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, and potential weeks of benefits for all extended and 
emergency benefits stemming from the Great Recession.  The simulation suggest that 
approximately 17% of individuals included in past studies were ineligible for UI while over two-
thirds of eligible respondents received benefits less than the maximum weekly benefit amount.  I 
then exclude the 17% of ineligible respondents included in past studies and focus the analysis on 
variations in each respondent's individual replacement rate which was not possible in past studies 
as both the weekly benefit amount and base period earnings were unobserved.  
The results suggest that higher replacement rates are associated with large reductions in 
time spent searching for a job during normal economic conditions with elasticities ranging from  
-2.2 to -5.8, which are larger in magnitude than past studies have found which relied on state 
variation in UI generosity.  However, the results are more mitigated during the Great Recession 
and post recession period with higher replacement rates being associated with small and 
statistically insignificant effects on search times, with elasticity estimates ranging from -.6 to 0,  
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although the years 2009 and 2010 which were at the height of the labor market decline appear to 
be partially driving these results.  Overall, the results suggest that the moral hazard that UI can 
induce might be more mitigated during adverse economic conditions.  The findings suggest that 
optimal unemployment benefits might vary throughout the business cycle.   
2. Literature Review 
Since its inception in the United States in the late 1930s, there has always been a great 
deal of concern that UI produces a “moral hazard” effect where leisure is subsidized through 
unemployment insurance and this “moral hazard” effect is often assumed to be increasing in UI 
generosity.  As predicted by UI search models such as Mortensen (1977) and Moffitt and 
Nicholson (1982), UI lowers search intensity and raises reservation wages of recipients in both 
the replacement rate and duration of potential benefits.  There is also a large empirical literature 
that examines the effects of increased benefit amounts on spell duration.  For example Moffitt 
(1985), Solon (1985), Meyer (1990), and others have found that a 10% increase in benefit levels 
increases spell duration by an average of between 3-8%.  There has also been a large literature 
that examines how increases in potential weeks of benefits affect spell duration.  For example, 
Moffitt (1985), Solon (1985), Katz and Meyer (1990), Card and Levine (2000), and others have 
found that a one week increase in potential benefits increases spell duration by between .08-.30 
weeks.  There has also been a renewed interest in how additional potential weeks of  benefits 
affect spell duration during the Great Recession as potential weeks of benefits reached up to 99 
weeks for certain individuals.  Farber and Valletta (2013) and Rothstein (2011) find a small but 
statistical increase in unemployment caused by the large increase in potential weeks of benefits.  
While estimates vary widely, most research suggests that more generous unemployment benefits 
in terms of benefit amounts and potential weeks of benefits increase spell duration although the 
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size of this effect might vary throughout the business cycle.  There are several potential 
explanations for this explored in the literature including that UI could be reducing search 
intensity, increasing reservation wages leading some individuals to not accept job offers, or it 
could be providing individuals more time to seek higher quality employment matches.1   
This paper focuses on the effects of unemployment insurance generosity on the search 
intensity of the unemployed, which has been an area of growing interest in recent years.  
Historically since the inception of requiring active job search for unemployment classification in 
the United States in 1940, most survey datasets have asked respondents about whether they have 
searched for a job in the last four weeks as this is a necessary requirement for being considered 
unemployed.2  However conditional upon search, most datasets provide little information about 
search intensity in terms of how much effort an individual puts into searching for a job.  
Historically this has led to little being known about the search intensity of individuals that report 
searching through effort level or time spent searching.  However, in recent years several papers 
have attempted to examine the search intensity of the unemployed.  Shimer (2004) examines 
how search intensity varies throughout the business cycle.  Using the Current Population Survey, 
Shimer proxies for search intensity of individuals using the number of search methods that 
respondents reported using during the four weeks preceding the CPS interview.  Shimer 
hypothesizes that more methods of search imply a higher level of search intensity.  Shimer’s 
findings suggest that search intensity is acyclical.  Other papers have examined the search 
intensity of young cohorts using the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).  
Holzer (1988) examines the search methods and intensity of unemployed males aged 16-23 using 
1 For papers about UI generosity and reservation wages see Feldstein and Poterba (1984), Shimer and Werning 
(2007), and Krueger and Mueller (2013).  For papers about UI generosity and match quality see Centeno (2004) 
and Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2011).  
2 See Card (2011) for the origins of the unemployment rate.   
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the 1981 panel of the NLSY79.  Like most surveys, the NLSY79 asks non-employed respondents 
the types of search methods that they used in the past four weeks while the 1981 panel included a 
job search questionnaire that asked respondents about the amount of time that they had spent on 
each type of job search for the week preceding the survey.  Holzer finds that the most productive 
search methods were contacting friends and relatives and direct applications without referral 
which also had the highest levels of search intensity among the youth male cohort that Holzer 
examined.  Paserman (2008) uses the NLSY79 from 1985-1996 to estimate the degree of 
hyperbolic discounting for job search.  To estimate the convexity of the cost function of 
searching, Paserman uses the NLSY 1981 job search questionnaire to obtain data on time spent 
on various methods of search and their effectiveness.  Paserman finds a large degree of 
hyperbolic discounting among low and medium wage workers.   
Another recent method of examining search intensity has been to use time use data from 
the ATUS.  Krueger and Mueller (2010) examine the effects of unemployment insurance 
generosity on the search intensity of the unemployed using the ATUS from 2003-2007.  Since 
information relating to unemployment insurance eligibility or receipt is not provided in the 
ATUS or CPS monthly files, Krueger and Mueller impute UI eligibility based on the cause of 
unemployment and spell duration.  They then use the state maximum weekly benefit for the 
given year to proxy as an indicator of UI generosity.  Krueger and Mueller’s findings suggest 
that more generous UI benefits (increases in the state maximum weekly benefit) are associated 
with lower levels of search intensity with elasticity estimates between -1.6 to -2.2.  Guler and 
Taskin (2013) use ATUS files from 2003-2008 while also imputing UI eligibility and using the 
state maximum weekly benefit as a proxy for UI generosity to examine how UI affects 
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household production.3  Their findings suggest that there is a negative relationship between 
household production and UI generosity.  Other papers have used similar UI imputation 
procedures with time use data.  DeLoach and Kurt (2013) use the ATUS from 2003-2011, to 
examine the effects of macroeconomic shocks on search intensity.  DeLoach and Kurt estimate a 
similar model to that of Krueger and Mueller (2010) while including additional controls to model 
for macroeconomic shocks.  While assuming maximum weeks of benefits, they model for both 
extended and emergency unemployment benefits.  For the analysis DeLoach and Kurt include 
the log of the vacancy to unemployment rate from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey 
(JOLTS), log of housing prices from Case-Shiller, and in certain specifications homeownership.  
DeLoach and Kurt find that deteriorating labor market conditions reduce search intensity, while 
the effects are mitigated by declines in household wealth.   
In addition to not providing information about UI eligibility or receipt another limitation 
with the ATUS is that sample sizes are quite limited, especially for unemployed individuals that 
searched for employment over the ATUS observation period which is 24 hours.  To address this, 
Mukoyama, Patterson, and Sahin (2013) examine how job search behavior varies over the 
business cycle using the ATUS to impute search intensity in the CPS.  To do this they first 
examine how search times vary by type of search and number of types of search, which is 
essentially an empirical test of Shimer (2004) that more methods of search implies a higher 
search intensity.  After finding that more methods of search on average lead to higher levels of 
search time, Mukoyama et al. impute search time spent in the CPS based on the number and type 
of methods that CPS respondents reported undertaking, which takes advantage of the ATUS 
providing both the number of search methods and time spent searching over the 24 hour diary 
3 Guler and Taskin define household production as activities that are used for the production of goods and services 
at home instead of purchasing such goods and services from a market. 
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day.  Similar to DeLoach and Kurt, Mukoyama et al. assume the maximum weeks of benefits 
and model both extended and emergency unemployment benefits.  Their findings suggest that 
aggregate job search intensity is countercyclical at both the extensive and intensive margins.  
Aguiar, Hurst, and Karabarbounis (2013) use data from the ATUS from 2003-2010 to examine 
time use during the Great Recession.  They find that job search replaces between 2-6% of 
foregone hours worked, while home production and leisure absorb approximately 30% and 50% 
of forgone hours worked, respectively. 
As noted above, one limitation with the American Time Use Survey is that no 
information is asked in the survey regarding unemployment insurance eligibility or receipt.  This 
has led several authors (Krueger and Mueller (2010), DeLoach and Kurt (2013), Mukoyama et 
al. (2013), and Guler and Taskin (2013)) to impute UI eligibility based on the cause of 
unemployment where voluntary job leavers and new and reentrants are ineligible for benefits 
while classifying all other unemployed individuals with spells less than the maximum potential 
weeks of benefits as being eligible.4  The logic behind this approach is that voluntary job leavers 
have often been excluded from receiving unemployment insurance and that new and reentrants 
often lack sufficient earnings to qualify for UI.  After eligibility has been imputed, the procedure 
then uses the state maximum weekly benefit amount for the year that the spell was observed to 
proxy as an indicator of UI generosity. 
While this imputation procedure has been helpful in the literature for examining the 
effects of unemployment insurance receipt on search intensity, there are three primary concerns 
with the approach.  First, without observing base period earnings, it is not possible to know if an 
4 A growing number of papers have used a similar procedure on CPS data to impute UI eligibility (see Valletta and 
Kuang (2010), Farber and Valletta (2013), and Rothstein (2011)). 
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individual was ever monetarily eligible for unemployment insurance during the course of the 
unemployment spell.  This has led several authors to include monetarily ineligible individuals in 
their samples.  Second, since base period earnings are unobserved, the approach is unable to 
estimate the actual benefit amount that an individual would receive and instead relies on 
variations in the state maximum weekly benefit amount.  Given that only around 35% of UI 
recipients receive the maximum weekly benefit amount, the procedure could grossly overstate UI 
generosity for a large fraction of the sample.  This can be seen in Table 1 for 2013 as actual UI 
payments can vary significantly from the state maximum weekly benefit amount.  For example 
as displayed in Table 1, benefits can range from 33-674 dollars in Massachusetts, meaning that 
someone receiving a 33 dollar benefit would get a proxy value of 674 dollars (the state maximum 
weekly benefit amount) while someone receiving the same 33 dollar benefit in Mississippi would 
get a proxy value of 235 dollars.  Moreover, the percentage of recipients receiving the maximum 
weekly benefit can vary significantly by state.  Third, weeks of benefits are often determined by 
base period earnings, where 26 weeks of state benefits is often the maximum potential weeks of 
benefits in most states.5  However in many states, it is possible to qualify for significantly less 
than 26 weeks of benefits and thus the imputation procedure might incorrectly assign 26 weeks 
to individuals that are eligible for significantly fewer weeks.6  This could mean that if the 
duration of an individual’s unemployment spell has surpassed the actual weeks of benefits 
available to the individual but is less than 26 weeks, the procedure would misclassify the 
individual as still being eligible for UI when the individual would actually no longer be eligible 
for UI.  To address these concerns, I obtain work histories of unemployed respondents through 
5 At the start of 2013, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, and South Carolina had maximum potential 
weeks of benefits between 20-25 weeks while Montana and Massachusetts offered maximums between 28-30 
weeks. 
6 The exceptions to this being Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, and 
West Virginia which follow uniform distributions of 26 potential weeks of benefits.  
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fully matching ATUS respondents to all of their observations in the CPS, the population from 
which they are drawn.  This allows for full simulation of UI eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, 
and potential weeks of benefits.   
3.  Data  
To examine the relationship between unemployment insurance generosity and search 
intensity, I use data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) from 2003-2013.  Since the 
ATUS provides no direct information about UI eligibility, I match ATUS respondents to their 
longitudinal data from the Current Population Survey, the dataset from which the ATUS is 
drawn.  I then run earnings histories of unemployed respondents through a simulation program 
that calculates UI eligibility, benefit amounts, and potential weeks of benefits available.  In the 
remainder of this section, I discuss the American Time Use Survey and Current Population 
Survey as well as the matching procedure and simulations used for the analysis.    
 
3.1 The American Time Use Survey  
The American Time Use Survey (ATUS) is the primary source of how, where, and with 
whom Americans spend their time.  The survey is produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and has been collecting monthly data since 2003.  The ATUS population is drawn from the 8th 
(and final) wave of the Current Population Survey, and interviews are conducted 2-5 months 
after the final CPS observation is taken.  Sample households are selected based on the 
characteristics of the CPS reference person (the person who provided the household information 
during the CPS interviews), and the respondent is then randomly selected from the list of adults 
(age 15 or older) from within the household.  Sample sizes for 2003 are 1,700 time diaries per 
month and this number was cut to 1,100 starting in 2004 due to budgetary cuts.  The total sample 
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size collected from 2003 through 2013 is 148,345.  To avoid retirement effects, attention is 
focused on individuals age 20-65 that report being unemployed at the time of the ATUS 
interview.  For an individual to be considered unemployed they cannot have a job, they must be 
available for a job, and must have actively sought employment in the past four weeks.  In total, 
there are 5,555 unemployed individuals in the ATUS between the ages of 20-65 from 2003-2013 
(see Table 2).7   
The ATUS records time use data on a multitude of activities.  More precisely, 
respondents report each activity they undertook in the past 24 hours (from 4 a.m. to 4 a.m., 
ending on the interview day), how long they spent on that activity, where that activity took place, 
and who was with them while they undertook the activity.  The ATUS only records primary 
activities and excludes secondary activities.  Given this, respondents cannot report multiple 
activities occurring simultaneously and must report the activity that they were primarily engaged 
in.  The primary variable of interest for this analysis is total time spent searching for a job.  This 
includes things such as all time spent on active and passive job search, time spent interviewing,  
and all other time related to job search.  In 2013, unemployed individuals in the US spent on 
average 28 minutes per day on activities related to finding a job (including travel related to job 
search).  Search times averaged 34 minutes per day on weekdays and 14 minutes per day on 
weekends.  However, only 16% of unemployed respondents searched for a job on their diary day 
implying significantly longer search times conditional upon search of approximately three hours 
on weekdays and two and a half hours on weekends.  
7 In the US active job search in the past four weeks is necessary for being considered unemployed.  Moreover, the 
reference week for employment status in the ATUS is defined as the 7 days prior to the interview, while in the CPS 
the reference week is the week prior to the interview. 
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While primarily asking time use questions, the survey also updates some information that 
was collected during the eighth wave of the CPS that could have changed since that interview.  
Of this updated information, the primary variables of interest to this analysis are a subset of labor 
force questions from the CPS.  The ATUS provides individuals’ labor force status using five 
groups: employed, employed not at work during the reference week, unemployed, unemployed 
on layoff, and not in the labor force.  More precisely, the ATUS asks all questions used in the 
CPS to determine if individuals are unemployed.  This includes questions relating to if an 
individual has a job, is available for a job, and questions relating to if an individual has searched 
for a job in the last four weeks.  If an individual searched for a job then the types of search 
methods that the individual used are also provided.  The ATUS also provides information on 
recall status for individuals on layoff, whether individuals that are not in the labor force and are 
over the age of 55 want a job, and hours worked for employed individuals.  However, the ATUS 
excludes several important CPS variables including unemployment duration and reason for 
unemployment.8  Moreover, like the CPS monthly files, no information is asked relating to 
unemployment insurance receipt or eligibility.   
 
3.2 Matching CPS files and Constructing Base Period Earnings 
Since the ATUS provides no information regarding UI eligibility, benefit amounts, and 
potential weeks of benefits, I first obtain ATUS respondents’ labor force histories from the 
respondents’ CPS observations.  The CPS follows a format where individuals are in the survey 
for four months then they are excluded from the survey for eight months and then reenter the 
8 To address these limitations, I model unemployment duration using unemployment duration from the CPS plus 
the time between surveys for individuals that were unemployed during both the eighth wave of the CPS and the 
ATUS.  For individuals that become unemployed between the CPS and ATUS, I model duration as the midpoint 
between the two surveys, where the surveys are typically 2-5 months apart. 
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survey for four additional months for a total of up to eight months in the survey over a sixteen 
month period.  Since the CPS follows houses (the physical location) rather than households, 
respondents can have anywhere from 1-8 CPS interviews, although all ATUS respondents have 
an eighth wave CPS observation.  The CPS provides information on labor force status, hours 
worked, and wage earnings which are taken twice during the fourth and eighth waves of the 
survey.       
To create earnings histories, I first match individual’s basic monthly CPS files using 
respondents' household id, household number, family number, individual line number, initial 
month and year in sample, and state which combined uniquely identify individuals across time.  
The matching procedure produces an unbalanced panel of respondents’ observations ranging 
from 1-8 CPS observations.  However as noted by Madrian and Lefgren (1999) a significant 
number of matched individuals in the CPS have discrepancies in their data such as changes in 
sex, race, education, or age that are implausible.  To address these discrepancies, an algorithm 
was used where individuals are excluded from the analysis if their sex or race differs across any 
CPS observations that fall within a respondent's base period (the period where UI earnings test 
are conducted) or if discrepancies in age fall outside of a four year range for such observations.  
ATUS respondents are then matched to the longitudinal CPS files using a similar match 
validation technique.   
After matching the CPS files, respondents’ CPS labor force status, hours worked, and 
wage earnings are used to construct base period earnings, and in turn to determine monetary 
eligibility for UI.  Almost all states have base periods that use past earnings consisting of the 
earliest 4 of the last 5 completed calendar quarters preceding the filing of the UI claim to test for 
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monetary eligibility.9  These exclude the last completed quarter before the filing of a claim.  
Moreover, several states have implemented alternative base periods which generally test the last 
4 completed quarters if an individual does not qualify under a traditional base period.  ATUS 
respondents can have anywhere from 0-4 CPS observations during their base period, depending 
on the duration of their spell and the number of CPS interviews the respondent participated in. 
To construct base period earnings, I limit the analysis to individuals with four CPS observations 
during their base period or individuals that have three observations during their base period and 
have four observations during their alternative base period conditional on their states adopting 
alternative base periods before their spell start date.10   
To determine base period earnings, I first determine each respondent’s hourly wage rate.  
For earnings, I primarily rely on reported wage earnings which are taken in the fourth and eighth 
months of the CPS (the outgoing rotation groups).  Because earnings are only asked during the 
fourth and eighth waves of the survey, 17% of respondents have no reported earnings (or have 
imputed earnings) in the CPS even though many of these individuals held employment during 
their base periods.  In the case that an individual had no reported earnings or the individual’s 
earnings were imputed, I use predicted hourly wage calculated using CPS earnings files from 
2004-2005.  To do this, I estimate a wage equation used by Krueger and Mueller (2010) which 
they use to predict all of their observations hourly earnings of the form: 
(1) log(wis) = a + b Zi + ds + eis, 
9 Since the initial claim date is not provided in the ATUS or CPS, I use the spell start date which is often the same 
day (or week) as the initial claim date. 
10 Restricting the sample to respondents with four base period observations produces the most accurate estimates 
of UI eligibility, benefit amounts, and potential weeks of benefits but comes at a cost of slightly reducing the 
sample size.  I also explore estimates using three base period observations although the results become more 
noisy when using less than four base period observations.   
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where wis is hourly wage, Zi are controls for age, age squared, education controls for high school 
degree or less; some college; and college degree, female, and ds  are state fixed effects.  The wage 
equation was estimated using 319,813 workers from CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups 
(MORGs) files from 2004 and 2005.  The sample size of 319,813 was obtained through 
excluding students, self-employed, self-incorporated, and employed individuals with hourly 
earnings of less than $1 or more than $200.11  I then use the wage equation to predict 
unemployed individuals' hourly wage rate and use this to calculate base period earnings for 
individuals that I do not observe their earnings or have imputed earnings values in the CPS.12   
I then examine the hours worked for each employed CPS respondent that I observe 
during their base period and multiply this by the individual's hourly wage.  Individuals that are 
unemployed or not in the labor force for a given month during their base period (or alternative 
base period if available) receive a value of zero for the month.13  I then scale my earnings 
measure up to an annualized amount which provides base period earnings (see Chetty (2008), 
Gruber and Cullen (2000), Levine (1993), and LaLumia (2013) for examples of papers that use 
simulation programs for UI with scaled up earnings).14  
11 Following Krueger and Mueller, I adjust wages to account for topcoding. 
12 If an individual has earnings reported in both outgoing rotation groups then I use the earnings from the earlier 
period.   
13 A small number of respondents have industry and occupation codes that indicate that they are teachers and 
professors.  It is possible that these individuals could be receiving wage income during summer months even while 
reporting zero hours of employment.  When these individuals report zero hours worked during summer months, I 
exclude them from the analysis.   
14 Another option would be to use the CPS March Supplement (The ASEC) and merge this to the ATUS. The primary 
advantage of this is that the ASEC provides the weeks worked (and wage income) over the last calendar year.  
However, there are two primary disadvantages to this approach.  First, less than 25% of ATUS respondents have a 
valid ASEC observation, which is significantly lower than using full monthly files which leads to match rates over 
50%.  Second, the advantage of knowing weeks worked (and wage income) over the last calendar year is 
somewhat limited by the fact that a calendar year generally does not correspond to an individual’s base period 
unless the individual became unemployed between April-June using a traditional base period.  Given this any 
benefits from using the March CPS files instead of the full monthly CPS files are likely outweighed by the cost.  
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 3.3 UI Eligibility, Benefit Amounts, and Potential Weeks of Benefits 
To determine if unemployed ATUS respondents have sufficient earnings to qualify for 
UI, I run each unemployed ATUS respondent through a simulation program that determines if 
the respondent has sufficient base period earnings to qualify for UI for the individual's state of 
residence.  If an individual has sufficient earnings to qualify for UI then the simulation also 
calculates the individual's weekly benefit amount including any dependent allowances when 
applicable.15  While reported recipiency and benefit amounts are latent in this analysis, there are 
two main advantages of using simulated eligibility and benefits rather than reported benefits.  
First, UI take-up is endogenous.  As noted by Blank and Card (1991) take-up rates among 
eligibles are typically around 67%.  If take-up is correlated with search intensity then using 
actual benefits received would lead to a biased coefficient estimate on benefits received.  Second, 
UI receipt is often unreported and misreported in survey data.  As noted by Meyer, Mok, and 
Sullivan (2009), UI receipt is often unreported with average yearly reporting rates of 73.8% in 
the PSID, 74.7% in the SIPP, and 79.2% in the ASEC (March CPS).  Hence simulation based 
methods can help to address these concerns.  
The simulation then calculates the number of potential weeks of benefits that each 
individual is eligible for, which is typically between 12-26 weeks depending on the individuals’ 
base period earnings and the state where the UI claim is based.  The simulation also calculates all 
potential weeks of extended and emergency benefits.  This is important as potential weeks of 
 15 Dependent allowances are additional monetary payments made by states to eligible UI recipients who have 
qualifying dependents.  The states that pay dependent allowances at some point during the sample period are 
Alaska, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.  Dependent allowances can range from a minimum of $5 per 
week in Pennsylvania (with one qualifying dependent) up to $300 per week in Massachusetts (with twelve 
qualifying dependents; $25 per dependent).  
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benefits reached as many as 99 weeks during the Great Recession and individuals in the data can 
be eligible for 1-99 potential weeks of benefits.16  Aggregate unemployment and aggregate 
unemployment claims by type of claim and year are displayed in Figure 1.  
In addition to monetary conditions, all states also have non-monetary conditions that can 
exclude voluntary job leavers, individuals not available for full-time employment, individuals 
fired for cause, and individuals that are eligible for UI but not actively seeking employment, 
among other requirements.  To address non-monetary conditions, I also impose restrictions 
similar to Krueger and Mueller (2010).  To do this, I use data from both the ATUS as well as the 
final wave of the CPS which is provided in the ATUS to classify each of the 5,555 unemployed 
individuals between the ages of 20-65 into four groups: On Temporary Layoff (N=703), New 
and Reentrants (N=2,125), Voluntary Job Leavers (N=138), and Job Losers (N=2,589).  More 
specifically unemployed individuals are classified as:     
• On Temporary Layoff:  if they are classified as on layoff during the ATUS interview.  
• New and Reentrants:  if they were not in the labor force in the CPS and were 
unemployed in the ATUS and those that were unemployed in the CPS and indicated they 
were either a New or Reentrant and were still unemployed in the ATUS.   
• Voluntary Job Leavers:  those who were unemployed in the CPS and indicated they 
voluntarily left their job and remain unemployed in the ATUS. 
• Job Losers:  those who were unemployed in the CPS and indicated that they had lost 
their job with no expectation of recall, individuals that were unemployed in the CPS 
16 State benefits can range from 1-30 weeks for eligible individuals, while extended benefits can range from 0-20 
weeks, and emergency unemployment compensation can range from 0-53 weeks (although jointly they can only 
run for a maximum of 99 weeks).      
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whose temporary jobs had ended, and individuals that were employed in the CPS and 
subsequently became unemployed with no expectation of recall.   
 
I then classify New and Reentrants and Voluntary Job Leavers as ineligible for UI as many states 
have historically excluded Voluntary Job Leavers from receiving UI while New and Reentrants 
typically lack sufficient wage earnings during their base period to qualify for UI.17  I then 
classify monetarily eligible Job Losers and those On Temporary Layoff with weeks remaining as 
eligible for UI and assign them their individual replacement rate.  I focus my analysis on Job 
Losers as they are the largest of the groups and they are also most likely to satisfy non-monetary 
conditions needed to qualify for UI while excluding individuals On Temporary Layoff as they 
likely face different incentives than Job Losers (see Feldstein (1976), Feldstein (1978), and 
Topel (1983)).      
 
3.4 Sample Characteristics 
Sample characteristics are displayed in Table 2.  There are 5,555 unemployed individuals 
in the ATUS between the ages of 20-65 from 2003-2013 with 2,589 of these individuals being 
classified as Job Losers.  Of the Job Losers, 2,017 had unemployment durations below their 
states' maximum  potential weeks of benefits including all extended and emergency benefits.18   
Of these, 1,060 have four observed observations during their base period.  For Job Losers with 
17 Using my simulations, it is possible to test if New and Reentrants have sufficient wage earnings during their base 
period to qualify for UI.  For New and Reentrants between the ages of 20-65 with durations below their states' 
maximum  potential weeks of benefits including extended and emergency benefits, one third (33.6%) are 
monetarily eligible for UI.  However, there is still some concern about whether these individuals satisfy non-
monetary conditions which are more difficult to address.  Furthermore, many states offer benefits to voluntary job 
leavers if they view the reason for the voluntary exit as a compelling family reason, although this cannot be 
observed in the data.      
18 I also exclude a small number of individuals that worked part-time during their base period and live in states that 
don't pay benefits to individuals seeking part-time employment. 
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four observations in their base period and satisfying the match quality algorithm, there are 1,013 
such individuals implying that the procedure is able to match half (50.22%) of the Job Losers 
that are potentially eligible for UI in the ATUS between the ages of 20-65.   
Each of the 1,013 potentially eligible Job Losers with four valid base period observations 
satisfying the match quality algorithm were then run through a UI simulation program that 
biennially captures the structure of each state UI system to determine monetary eligibility, 
weekly benefit amounts, and potential weeks of benefits for each respondent.  Of these, 144 
(14.2%) have observed base period earnings that are insufficient to be monetarily eligible for UI 
while 28 (2.8%) were eligible for less than the maximum weeks of benefits and had exceeded 
their maximum  potential weeks of benefits implying that 17% of observed Job Losers are 
ineligible from receiving UI.  After excluding the 17% of Job Losers that are ineligible for UI, 
the sample is composed of 841 monetarily eligible respondents that have not surpassed their 
maximum potential weeks of benefits.  I then exclude 18 individuals from the analysis that have 
replacement rates above 100% or that make the minimum weekly benefit amount as this can lead 
to extremely large replacement rates in many states.19  This leaves a sample of 823 individuals 
from 2003-2013 that are still eligible for UI with remaining potential weeks of benefits.  For 
these individuals, the average replacement rate is 48.12%.20  Moreover 32.20% of these 
individuals make the maximum weekly benefit in their state which is consistent with Krueger 
and Meyer’s (2002) estimate of approximately 35%.  
19 Since the state minimum weekly benefit amount is often legislated by law, it is possible to qualify for UI in many 
states with earnings less than what is needed to qualify for the minimum weekly benefit amount using a state's UI 
benefit formula which can lead to large replacement rates.    
20 When applicable, the replacement rate includes a $25 benefit increase in UI benefits from the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act that was available from February 2009 until December 2010 for claims filed before 
May 27, 2010.   
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Table 3 displays weighted means of each variable included in the model stratified by year 
as well as a comparison to the weighted means of all Job Losers aged 20-65 that have 
unemployment durations less than their states' maximum potential weeks of benefits.  For 2003-
2013 mean job search was 60 minutes per day compared to 56 minutes for all Job Losers with 
the difference being slightly more pronounced for the 2003-2007 period.  The average age of the 
sample is 41 years compared to 39 years for all Job Losers.  The sample is slightly more 
educated than Job Losers with 25% of the sample having a college degree compared to 21% of 
Job Losers.  Females makeup 42% of the sample compared to 43% of Job Losers.  Moreover, the 
sample is slightly more likely to have a partner than Job Losers with 59% of the sample having a 
partner relative to 53% of Job Losers.  The largest difference between the sample and Job Losers 
is homeownership with 71% of individuals in the sample being homeowners relative to 58% of 
Job Losers.21  With the exception of homeownership, the means in Table 3 suggest that the 
sample and Job Losers are similar in regards to the variables used in the analysis.    
 
4.  Model  
For the 823 ATUS respondents meeting this criterion from 2003-2013, I model search 
intensity following Krueger and Mueller (2010) while replacing log of maximum weekly benefit 
with each respondents' UI replacement rate.  My model is then of the form:  
(2) Searchist = α + β1 Replacement Rateist + β2 log(𝑤� is) + β3 std(resid w)s + π1 Xi +  dt + uist, 
where Searchist  is total minutes of the diary day that were devoted to job search, Replacement 
Rateist  is the ratio of each individual’s weekly benefit amount to the individual’s average weekly 
21  This difference is primarily caused by the CPS following houses (the physical location) rather than individuals 
which increases the likelihood that individuals that move frequently will be excluded from the analysis.  To address 
this difference, I include additional controls in certain specifications that control for homeownership.    
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wage during the individual’s base period, 𝑤� is is the predicted hourly wage of worker i in state s, 
std(resid w)s  is a dispersion parameter created from the wage equation in Section 3, Xi are 
controls for age, age squared, education controls for high school degree or less; some college; 
and college degree, female, partner, children in the household, interactions between female and 
partner and female and children, weekend, and dt are month and year fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are clustered by state.  Moreover, all regressions are weighted using official survey 
weights.  To isolate the component of UI variation that is only a function of variations in state UI 
generosity, I follow Gruber (1997) and instrument each individual’s replacement rate with a 
simulated replacement rate.  To create the simulated replacement rate, I run each of the 823 UI 
eligible individuals from the 2003-2013 period through the simulation program for each state-
year cell and calculate the average replacement rate biannually.22 23  To ensure the validity of the 
instrument, F-Statistics for the significance of the instrument excluded from the structural model 
are included after each IV model.  The F-Statistics across all specifications range from 12-67, 
which exceed the rule of thumb value of 10 (see Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo 
(2005)).  Hence the instrument does not appear to be weak.     
To address the large changes in economic conditions and increases in potential weeks of 
UI benefits during the Great Recession, I stratify the sample into the 2003-2007 period and 2008-
2013 period as well as including the entire sample period from 2003-2013.  I also include 
additional macroeconomic controls in certain specifications to control for variations in economic 
conditions throughout the period.  These include controls for the monthly state unemployment 
rate at the time of the ATUS observation, homeownership, the real value of the Case-Shiller 
22 For similar applications used in the Medicaid literature see Currie and Gruber (1996), Gruber and Yelowitz 
(1999), and Brown, Kowalski, and Lurie (2014).   
23 Krueger and Mueller (2010) include corresponding IV models using state level variation in UI generosity where 
they instrument for the state average weekly benefit amount using the state maximum weekly benefit amount in 
certain specifications.  
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National Home Price Index, the interaction between homeownership and the real value of the 
Case-Shiller National Home Price Index, and the real value of the S&P500. 
 
5. Results  
The results for how UI generosity affects search intensity are displayed in Table 4.  The 
results suggest that for the entire sample period from 2003-2013, higher replacement rates are 
associated with reductions in search intensity.  The baseline estimates suggest that each 
percentage point increase in an individual’s replacement rate is on average associated with a 1.24 
minute per day reduction in search times producing an elasticity of -1.0 while the IV estimates 
suggest a reduction of 1.43 minutes per day producing and elasticity of -1.2 with an average 
search time of 60 minutes per day.  However, given the large amount of unemployment and lack 
of employment opportunities that arose following the Great Recession, the estimates for this 
period are much larger in magnitude when the years 2009-2010 are excluded from the analysis 
(See Table 6, Specification 5).  For the 2003-2013 period (excluding 2009 and 2010), the 
baseline estimates suggest that each percentage point increase in an individual’s replacement rate 
is on average associated with a 1.56 minute per day reduction in search times producing an 
elasticity of -1.2 while the IV estimates suggest a reduction of 5.60 minutes per day producing 
and elasticity of -4.2 with an average search time of 64 minutes per day.  While the results 
suggest that higher replacement rates are associated with reductions in search intensity, the 
stratified sample suggests that there are large differences in the effect of UI generosity in the pre 
and post periods of the Great Recession.   
The results suggest that for the 2003-2007 period, higher replacement rates were 
associated with large reductions in search intensity.  The baseline estimates suggest that each 
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percentage point increase in an individual’s replacement rate is on average associated with a 2.65 
minute per day reduction in search times implying an elasticity of -2.2 while the IV estimates 
suggest a much larger reduction of 7.04 minutes per day implying an elasticity of -5.8 with an 
average search time of 58 minutes per day.  The elasticities are larger in magnitude than Krueger 
and Mueller’s (2010) OLS estimate of -1.6 for all Job Losers for the 2003-2007 period using the 
maximum weekly benefit.24  However, since I am estimating this on a subsample of  Krueger 
and Mueller’s sample while excluding 16% of respondents that I observe that were never 
monetarily eligible for UI or had exceeded their maximum weeks of benefits, it is possible that 
sample heterogeneity is driving these differences.  To test for sample heterogeneity,  I reestimate 
Krueger and Mueller's OLS model for my sample of 285 individuals and obtain an elasticity 
estimate of -1.5 which is slightly smaller in magnitude than Krueger and Mueller's estimate for 
all Job Losers with durations below the state maximum potential weeks of benefits of -1.6 
implying that sample heterogeneity is not driving these differences.  My elasticity estimates 
between -2.2 and -5.8 suggest that reductions in search times caused by increases in UI 
generosity for this period are much larger than previously thought.      
While the results in Table 4 suggest that for the 2003-2007 period higher replacement 
rates were associated with large reductions in time spent searching for a job, the effects are much 
smaller for the 2008-2013 period.  The baseline estimates suggest that each percentage point 
increase in an individual’s replacement rate is on average associated with a .72 minute reduction 
per day in search times implying an elasticity of -.6 while the IV estimates suggest no reduction 
with a coefficient of zero and an elasticity of 0, with both coefficients being statistically 
24  Since Krueger and Mueller are using the maximum weekly benefit as a proxy for the generosity of the weekly 
benefit amount and since the replacement rate = (weekly benefit amount / the average weekly wage in the base 
period)*100, a 1% increase in UI generosity would increase the weekly benefit amount and hence the replacement 
rate by 1% which allows for the direct comparison between elasticities for the maximum weekly benefit amount 
and the replacement rate.    
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insignificant.  The average search time was 62 minutes per day over this period.  For the 2008-
2013 period (excluding 2009 and 2010 and displayed in Table 6), the baseline estimates suggest 
that each percentage point increase in an individual’s replacement rate is on average associated 
with a .62 minute per day reduction in search times producing an elasticity of -.4 while the IV 
estimates suggest a reduction of 4.33 minutes per day producing and elasticity of -2.8 with an 
average search time of 69 minutes per day.  The results suggest that higher replacement rates had 
little effect on search intensity during the Great Recession and the period following the Great 
Recession, although the years 2009 and 2010 which were at the height of the labor market 
decline appear to be partially driving these results.                                                                        
One concern with these estimates is the large amount of economic variation that occurred 
throughout the 2003-2013 period.  To address this concern, Table 5 displays estimates with 
additional macroeconomic controls.  These include controls for the seasonally adjusted monthly 
state unemployment rate, homeownership, the log of the real Case-Shiller National Home Price 
Index, the interaction between homeownership and the log of the real Case-Shiller National 
Home Price Index, and the log of the real value of the S&P500.  The additional macroeconomic 
controls are noisy and add little additional fit to the model.  The results in Table 4 are robust to 
the additional macroeconomic controls with the coefficient on Replacement Rate varying little 
between the two specifications. 
 Another concern with these estimates is the large number of weeks that individuals could 
receive UI benefits for during the period, which for certain individuals could be as many as 99 
weeks due to Extended and Emergency Benefits.  To address this concern, specification checks 
were run that included total weeks of benefits remaining and continuous weeks of benefits as 
well as additional robustness checks.  The results are displayed in Table 6 and are displayed by 
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year and whether macroeconomic controls were included.  Specification 1 and 2 control for 
unemployment duration and continuous weeks of benefits remaining, respectively.  For these 
specifications, the coefficients on unemployment duration and continuous weeks of benefits were 
statistically insignificant and had little effect on the coefficient on replacement rate.  
Specification 3 uses a Tobit model to address the mass of respondents that report not searching 
on their diary day.  The results are consistent with the baseline estimates in that the Tobit model 
suggests that more generous benefits are associated with lower search times for the 2003-2007 
period and associated with small and statistically insignificant effects for the 2008-2013 period.  
Specification 4 includes each individual’s weekly benefit amount in the baseline model.  The 
inclusion of the individual weekly benefit amount has little effect on the replacement rate and its 
coefficients are small and statistically insignificant in each of the models.  The fifth and final 
specification estimates both models for the post 2007 period and the entire sample period while 
excluding data from 2009 and 2010 to ensure that these years which were at the peak of the labor 
market decline are not driving the results.  For the 2008-2013 results (excluding 2009 and 2010; 
N=283), the coefficients are negative and larger in magnitude than the estimates including 2009 
and 2010 but are still statistically insignificant.  For the 2003-2013 period (excluding 2009 and 
2010; N=568), the coefficients are negative and larger in magnitude than the estimates including 
2009 and 2010.  This suggest that increases in UI generosity appear to lead to large reductions in 
search intensity although these results are mitigated by the large number of unemployed and lack 
of job openings for the 2009-2010 period.  In all, the specification checks suggest that the 
baseline results are robust.    
Overall the findings are consistent with other studies that have examined extended and 
emergency benefits during the Great Recession and found significantly smaller effects on 
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reemployment probabilities than in past studies and suggest that higher benefit levels might be 
acting in a similar manner (see Farber and Valletta (2013), Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and 
Mitman (2013), and Rothstein (2011)).  Moreover, the findings are complementary to much of 
the recent work studying optimal unemployment insurance (see Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011), 
Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2013), and Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2012)).  Overall 
the results indicate that more generous UI benefit amounts are associated with large reductions in 
search times during normal economic conditions although the effects appear to be more 
mitigated during the Great Recession and post recession period with higher replacement rates 
having little effect on search times, although the years 2009 and 2010 which were at the height of 
the labor market decline appear to be partially driving the latter result. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper provides the first nationally representative estimates of how unemployment 
insurance generosity in the United States affects the search intensity of unemployed individuals 
using individual level variation in UI generosity.  The paper expands the current literature 
through matching American Time Use Survey respondents to all of their observations in the 
Current Population Survey, the population from which they are drawn, and simulating monetary 
eligibility and entitlement to unemployment insurance at the individual level where past studies 
have been unable to examine monetary eligibility and have relied on state variations in the 
maximum weekly benefit amount which can differ significantly from an individual’s actual 
benefit amount.  The simulation is the first to fully simulate eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, 
and potential weeks of benefits for all extended and emergency benefits stemming from the 
Great Recession.  The results suggest that higher replacement rates are associated with large 
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reductions in time spent searching for a job during the 2003-2007 period.  However the results 
are more mitigated for the 2008-2013 period encompassing the Great Recession with higher 
replacement rates being associated with small and statistically insignificant effects on search 
times.  The results suggest that the moral hazard that UI can induce might be more mitigated 
during adverse economic conditions, especially at the height of the labor market decline during 
2009 and 2010.  This finding supports the view that optimal unemployment insurance benefits 
could be tied to labor market conditions, as more adverse economic conditions appear to reduce 
the moral hazard that more generous UI benefits are known to bring about.   
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Table 1 - UI Benefits in Dollars and Weeks by State for 2013a 
State Min-WBA Max-WBA Average WBA Average Weekly Wage Min-Weeks Max-Weeks 
Alabama 45 265 207 794 15 26 
Alaska 56 370 250 965 16 26 
Arizona 122 240 221 866 12 26 
Arkansas 81 451 289 736 9 25 
California 40 450 301 1,083 14 26 
Colorado 25 466 356 978 13 26 
Connecticut 15 591 345 1,230 26 26 
Delaware 20 330 245 1,002 24 26 
D.C. 50 359 299 1,523 19 26 
Florida 32 275 231 822 12 23 
Georgia 44 330 267 909 6 20 
Hawaii 5 534 424 781 26 26 
Idaho 72 357 264 693 10 26 
Illinois 51 413 324 1,016 26 26 
Indiana 37 390 243 799 8 26 
Iowa 59 396 337 780 7 26 
Kansas 114 456 341 791 10 26 
Kentucky 39 415 292 773 15 26 
Louisiana 10 247 207 849 26 26 
Maine 65 372 285 718 22 26 
Maryland 50 430 329 996 26 26 
Massachusetts 33 674 424 1,197 10 30 
Michigan 117 362 293 899 14 20 
Minnesota 24 393 376 970 11 26 
Mississippi 30 235 194 683 13 26 
Missouri 35 320 242 824 8 20 
Montana 127 446 290 695 8 28 
Nebraska 70 362 276 746 12 26 
Nevada 16 402 308 822 12 26 
New Hampshire 32 427 287 941 26 26 
New Jersey 87 624 398 1,141 1 26 
New Mexico 76 407 303 750 16 26 
New York 64 405 308 1,276 26 26 
North Carolina 46 535 290 833 13 26 
North Dakota 43 516 396 947 12 26 
Ohio 115 413 318 847 20 26 
Oklahoma 16 386 293 809 18 26 
Oregon 122 524 316 843 3 26 
Pennsylvania 70 573 360 934 18 26 
Rhode Island 45 566 351 870 15 26 
South Carolina 42 326 248 747 13 20 
South Dakota 28 333 276 680 15 26 
Tennessee 30 275 235 843 13 26 
Texas 62 440 341 999 10 26 
Utah 26 479 345 794 10 26 
Vermont 69 425 313 780 21 26 
Virginia 54 378 295 990 12 26 
Washington 143 604 387 1,012 1 26 
West Virginia 24 424 275 748 26 26 
Wisconsin 54 363 276 803 14 26 
Wyoming 33 459 359 859 11 26 
a.  Minimum and maximum values for benefits and potential weeks of benefits are as of January 1, 2013. 
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Table 2:  Determining UI Eligible Individuals and Sample Properties 
For individuals age 20-65     
 
Specification  2003-2007 2008-2013 2003-2013  
Unemployed  2,171 3,384 5,555 
 
     By Unemployment Type: 
    New or Reentrant  819 1,306 2,125 
 On Temporary Layoff  344 359 703 
 Job Leaver 65 73 138 
 Job Loser 943 1,646 2,589 
 
     Job Losers: 
    & Less than State Maximum Weeksa 677 1,340 2,017 
 & Four obs. in Base Period 362 698 1,060 
 & Excluding Bad Matches 347 666 1,013 
 & Monetarily Eligible  298 571 869 
 & Have Weeks Remaining  291 550 841  
 Percentage of Ineligible Job Losersb  16.14% 17.42% 16.98% 
 & WBA> Min WBA & RR<100% 285 538 823 
 
     Eligible: 
    Final Sample Size 285 538 823 
 Average Replacement Rate 46.10% 49.19% 48.12% 
 Percent Receiving Max WBA  33.33% 31.60% 32.20% 
 Number qualifying using ABP 13 26 39 
 Average Spell Duration (weeks) 9.62 14.65 12.90 
 Max Duration (weeks) 44 61 61 
 a: including all extended and emergency benefits 
   a: The difference between Job Losers and Less than State Maximum Weeks 
     also includes a small number of individuals that worked part-time during their  
    base period and live in states that don't pay benefits to individuals seeking  
     part-time employment. 
    b: Have Weeks Remaining / Four obs. in Base Period 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for ATUS Respondents Aged 20-65 
  
 2003-2007 2008-2013 2003-2013 
Specification  Mean  JL-Meana Mean  JL-Meana Mean  JL-Meana 
Job Search (minutes per day) 57.99 48.94 61.57 60.14 60.45 56.49 
Replacement Rate 47.41  50.14  49.28  log real Predicted Wage 2.92 2.84 2.82 2.76 2.85 2.79 
Dispersion Parameter 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Age 38.93 36.9 41.68 39.6 40.82 38.72 
Some College 0.34 0.3 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.29 
College Degree 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.21 0.25 0.21 
Female 0.37 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.43 
Female*Partner 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.22 
Female*Children 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.2 
Partner 0.58 0.53 0.6 0.53 0.59 0.53 
Children 0.49 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.43 
Weekend 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.28 
State Unemployment Rate  5.25 5.28 8.73 8.89 7.64 7.71 
Home Owner  0.76 0.59 0.7 0.58 0.71 0.58 
log Case-Shiller  5.34 5.36 5.05 5.04 5.14 5.15 
Home Owner x Case-Shiller  4.03 3.17 3.52 2.93 3.68 3.01 
log Real-S&P500 7.26 7.27 7.13 7.14 7.17 7.18 
N  285 677 538 1340 823 2017 
a:  Mean of all Job Losers in ATUS aged 20-65 with unemployment durations less than the state maximum potential weeks of benefits 
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Table 4: The Determinants of Job Search for UI Eligible Individuals 
Measured in Minutes per day Searching for a Job  
 
 2003-2007 2008-2013 2003-2013 
Specification  OLS  IV-2SLS
a OLS  IV-2SLS
a OLS  IV-2SLS
a 
Replacement Ratea -2.65** -7.04* -0.72 -0.00 -1.24* -1.43    
 
(1.19) (3.95) (0.75) (2.20) (0.65) (2.13)    
log real Predicted Wageb 131.76 193.50 -76.48 -91.41 -25.66 -21.95    
 
(130.64) (160.46) (84.81) (81.49) (72.10) (78.17)    
Dispersion Parameterb -238.77 -438.13 109.31 183.98 84.66 67.84    
 
(380.96) (399.72) (204.19) (275.52) (163.51) (230.17)    
Age -7.65 -12.84 14.74** 15.74** 8.37 8.09    
 
(9.97) (12.69) (6.75) (7.21) (5.28) (6.50)    
Age Squared 0.08 0.12 -0.16* -0.17** -0.09 -0.09    
 
(0.12) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)    
Some College -10.59 -30.24 38.06** 43.12** 25.80 24.58    
 
(32.17) (43.93) (18.08) (20.24) (16.85) (21.09)    
College Degree -29.60 -108.68 90.76* 106.39* 61.97 57.91    
 
(71.26) (115.04) (51.03) (55.05) (43.23) (56.31)    
Female 61.52 79.16* -35.19 -39.84* -14.25 -13.18    
 
(44.58) (46.11) (27.18) (23.11) (25.33) (22.69)    
Female*Partner -40.67 -16.77 -50.48* -52.11* -42.32** -41.73**  
 
(29.69) (37.10) (26.33) (26.62) (17.98) (19.45)    
Female*Children -4.44 -9.52 28.75 28.44 17.08 17.15    
 
(34.31) (34.83) (26.22) (25.68) (22.38) (21.96)    
Partner 6.20 -14.87 11.58 14.21 5.07 4.36    
 
(21.76) (23.10) (20.76) (21.57) (14.08) (15.46)    
Children 23.06 32.18 -22.43 -23.25 -5.93 -5.70    
 
(28.58) (29.38) (17.81) (17.23) (16.47) (16.04)    
Weekend -60.90*** -65.90*** -58.44*** -56.89*** -62.94*** -63.32*** 
 
(14.30) (13.42) (8.86) (10.97) (7.57) (9.17)    
Constant 110.73 370.73 -35.20 -115.97 3.54 17.17 
 
(218.45) (315.88) (115.92) (243.71) (103.90) (195.65) 
Time and Month Fixed Effects X X X X X X 
 
285 285 538 538 823 823 
F-Statistic for Instrumentc 
 
12.06  
 
 45.80 
 
60.20 
R-squared 0.2410 0.1334 0.2046 0.2009 0.1836 0.1833 
Note: * ** *** indicate coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level 
 Regressions are run with robust clustered standard errors at the state level.   
   For the Replacement and Unemployment Rates: 1=1%.    
    a:  The instrument for Replacement Rate is created through running the entire 2003-2013 sample though the simulation program 
     biannually for each state-year cell and taking the average replacement rate for the entire sample.   
 b:  Predicted Wage and Dispersion Parameter are generated out of sample using CPS data from 2004-2005.   
 c:  F-Statistics are for the significance of the instrument excluded from the structural model.  
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Table 5: The Determinants of Job Search for UI Eligible Individuals with Macroeconomic Controls 
Measured in Minutes per day Searching for a Job  
 
 2003-2007 2008-2013 2003-2013 Specification  OLS  IV-2SLSa OLS  IV-2SLSa OLS  IV-2SLSa 
Replacement Ratea -2.74** -7.82** -0.65 -0.20 -1.25* -1.61    
 
(1.11) (3.93) (0.74) (2.16) (0.63) (2.14)    
log real Predicted Wageb 124.08 175.48 -74.62 -82.33 -18.72 -12.97    
 
(127.53) (158.37) (88.33) (79.94) (72.97) (72.98)    
Dispersion Parameterb -421.12 -663.25 101.84 148.23 62.17 30.71    
 
(404.80) (444.15) (212.98) (285.73) (172.35) (238.10)    
Age -8.42 -13.27 14.61** 15.16** 7.72 7.26    
 
(9.80) (12.61) (6.77) (6.89) (5.45) (6.33)    
Age Squared 0.09 0.13 -0.16* -0.16** -0.08 -0.08    
 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)    
Some College -7.55 -26.54 40.88** 43.69** 26.93 24.97    
 
(28.07) (41.06) (19.48) (18.79) (17.56) (20.08)    
College Degree -21.25 -101.48 91.05 99.74* 59.72 52.99    
 
(69.83) (112.16) (56.40) (54.20) (44.98) (52.38)    
Female 43.35 55.14 -35.84 -38.51 -13.53 -11.84    
 
(42.94) (42.37) (29.82) (24.89) (26.42) (22.82)    
Female*Partner -22.90 9.86 -50.25* -51.34** -41.00** -39.83**  
 
(27.88) (39.17) (25.91) (25.99) (17.38) (19.40)    
Female*Children 0.48 -4.29 28.66 28.56 16.16 16.27    
 
(32.56) (31.15) (26.60) (25.69) (21.92) (21.40)    
Partner -1.34 -27.11 12.30 13.73 6.81 5.59    
 
(23.78) (27.32) (21.63) (21.43) (14.05) (15.17)    
Children 26.87 36.64 -20.30 -20.69 -4.40 -4.03    
 
(27.89) (28.94) (17.94) (17.31) (16.21) (15.77)    
Weekend -57.93*** -64.07*** -56.37*** -55.31*** -61.85*** -62.54*** 
 
(14.26) (13.26) (8.66) (10.60) (7.97) (9.35)    
State Unemployment Rate  7.31 10.91 -0.86 -0.86 -1.34 -1.32    
 
(10.38) (13.36) (3.78) (3.55) (3.61) (3.57)    
Home Owner  -562.71 -852.62 125.89 152.85 109.57 103.33    
 
(817.65) (898.01) (921.46) (872.91) (234.45) (233.96)    
log Case-Shiller  -504.05 -445.79 157.94 167.49 -47.14 -48.25    
 
(572.91) (551.22) (335.84) (314.78) (234.70) (227.19)    
Home Owner x Case-Shiller  98.03 151.02 -26.66 -31.77 -24.39 -23.33    
 
(152.91) (168.18) (182.95) (173.28) (45.38) (45.00)    
log Real-S&P500 -45.47 -35.05 52.94 59.66 59.96 55.04    
 
(294.97) (294.00) (65.81) (70.69) (68.83) (75.99)   
Constant 3166.34* 3123.84* -1243.37 -1381.18 -152.95 -84.88 
 
(1806.98) (1616.48) (1463.13) (1372.99) (1197.28) (1252.05) 
Time and Month Fixed Effects X X X X X X 
 
285 285 538 538 823 823 
F-Statistic for Instrumentc 
 
 21.20 
 
 54.52 
 
67.13 
R-squared 0.2410  0.1251  0.2095  0.2081  0.1884  0.1876 
Note: * ** *** indicate coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level 
 Regressions are run with robust clustered standard errors at the state level.   
   For the Replacement and Unemployment Rates: 1=1%.    
    a:  The instrument for Replacement Rate is created through running the entire 2003-2013 sample though the simulation program 
     biannually for each state-year cell and taking the average replacement rate for the entire sample.   
 b:  Predicted Wage and Dispersion Parameter are generated out of sample using CPS data from 2004-2005.   
 c:  F-Statistics are for the significance of the instrument excluded from the structural model.  
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Table 6: Robustness Checks for Coefficient Estimates of Replacement Rate for Various Specifications  
 
 2003-2007 2008-2013 2003-2013 
Specification  OLS/Tobit IV-2SLS
a OLS/Tobit IV-2SLS
a OLS/Tobit IV-2SLS
a 
Baseline Model: 
      (1) Including Unemployment Duration  -2.53** -7.03* -0.72 -0.02 -1.23* -1.45 
 
(1.18) (4.06) (0.75) (2.19) (0.65) (2.11) 
(2) Including Continuous Weeks Remaining -2.56** -7.04* -0.72 -0.03 -1.24* -1.47 
 
(1.19) (3.96) (0.75) (2.19) (0.65) (2.11) 
(3) Tobit Model  -5.22*** -13.31 -1.76 -1.44 -2.61** -4.81 
 
(1.90) (8.91) (1.22) (5.11) (1.02) (4.62) 
(4) Including ln(Real WBA) -2.61** -6.53* -0.75 -0.10 -1.28* -1.34 
 
(1.24) (3.46) (0.85) (1.81) (0.73) (1.81) 
(5) Excluding 2009-2010 
  
-0.64 -4.08 -1.56** -5.60*** 
   
(1.00) (3.00) (0.66) (2.08) 
       Baseline Model with Macro Controls: 
      (1)  Including Duration  -2.61** -7.82** -0.65 -0.20 -1.25* -1.62 
 
(1.10) (3.94) (0.75) (2.15) (0.63) (2.13) 
(2) Including Continuous Weeks Remaining -2.65** -7.84** -0.65 -0.41 -1.25* -1.71 
 
(1.11) (3.88) (0.75) (2.07) (0.63) (2.06) 
(3) Tobit Model  -4.90** -15.38* -1.75 -2.47 -2.72*** -5.83 
 
(1.89) (9.24) (1.24) (5.10) (1.03) (4.72) 
(4) Including ln(Real WBA) -2.48** -7.30** -0.68 -0.24 -1.30* -1.49 
 
(1.15) (3.38) (0.86) (1.79) (0.72) (1.83) 
(5) Excluding 2009-2010 
  
-0.62 -4.33 -1.72*** -5.88*** 
  
  
(0.96) (2.79) (0.60) (1.91) 
Note: * ** *** indicate coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level 
  Regressions are run with robust clustered standard errors at the state level.   
    For the Replacement Rate: 1=1%.    
    a:  The instrument for Replacement Rate is created through running the entire 2003-2013 sample though the simulation program 
      biannually for each state-year cell and taking the average replacement rate for the entire sample.    
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